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ABSTRACT 
This study explores when employees are more or less likely to voluntarily exit after having 
unsuccessfully applied for a new job within their organization.  Although prior work suggests 
that employees react negatively to rejection, we propose that employees will react differently 
based on how their experience during the hiring process shapes their perceptions about their 
prospects for future internal mobility.  Drawing on insights from the literatures on vacancy 
chains, social exchange, and expectancy violations, we argue that rejected internal candidates 
will use three sources of information from the hiring process in assessing their potential for 
future advancement: (1) whether the “winner” was an internal or external candidate, (2) how far 
they made it in the hiring process, and (3) how likely they were to be hired for the job.  Using 
data on over 2,000 internal losers at a single organization, we find that rejected internal 
candidates are less likely to leave when the job is filled with another internal candidate, when 
they make it further in the hiring process before rejection, and when their expectations of being 
hired for the job are likely to be lower.  The results highlight the importance of understanding 
how rejection shapes careers and mobility in contemporary internal labor markets.
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WHEN LOSERS BECOME LEAVERS: 
REJECTION AND TURNOVER IN INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary internal labor markets (ILMs) look dramatically different than their 
traditional counterparts.  Careers in traditional ILMs were centrally managed, and workers 
advanced along well-defined job ladders – attributes which largely shielded workers from having 
to openly compete for jobs (Jacoby, 2005).  As firms have come to prioritize flexibility over 
stability, however, the structures supporting traditional ILMs have largely disappeared, and a 
notable consequence is increased competition for new job opportunities (Piore, 2002).  The rapid 
adoption of job posting systems has aided this increase, as employers now place the onus on 
employees to seek out new internal opportunities absent defined paths for advancement while 
also routinely hiring externally at all levels of the organization (Cappelli & Keller, 2014; Royal 
& Althauser, 2003).  An important but overlooked consequence of this increased competition is 
the creation of a substantial number of internal “losers,” or employees who apply for new jobs 
within their current firm but are not selected.  Because rejection is now such a common feature 
of individuals’ careers, studying how internal rejection affects future mobility is important for 
more fully understanding those contemporary careers. 
 Though unsuccessful internal candidates have received limited scholarly attention (see 
Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004; Ford, Truxillo, & Bauer, 2009), an underlying theme in the 
current literature is that employees react negatively to an internal rejection.  For example, 
unsuccessful internal candidates may experience decreases in job-related attitudes like 
commitment (e.g., Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Shalit, 1992) and increased perceptions of 
unfairness (e.g., Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Robinson, 1996).  More recent work, however, 
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hints that not all candidates may react similarly to being rejected for jobs.  For example, Vough 
and Caza (2017) argue that employees who experience denied promotions reshape perceived 
career identities in ways that allow them to benefit from rejection.  That employees may respond 
differently to rejection has important implications for how we think about mobility and careers 
and how organizations manage rejection.  First, understanding why and how unsuccessful 
internal candidates respond to rejection has the potential to provide a more complete picture of 
contemporary ILMs, where market-oriented approaches to internal mobility have proliferated 
and rejection is frequent yet understudied.  Second, studying differential responses to internal 
rejection may provide insight on employees’ career trajectories within organizations following 
rejection, adding to the growing research on contemporary careers that has generally focused on 
outcomes following successful job moves (e.g., Bidwell & Mollick, 2015).  Finally, internal 
candidates’ responses to rejection can have significant consequences for organizations, 
particularly if different aspects of rejection predict whether they are more or less likely to leave.  
Not all rejected candidates are low performers that organizations want to dismiss, and in 
instances where functional turnover does occur, the costs associated with recruiting, selecting, 
and training new employees are likely to be considerable. 
We explore whether and why some internal candidates may be more or less likely to 
voluntarily exit the organization following a rejection.  To do so, we conceptualize rejection as a 
source of information, building on recent theoretical and empirical work that suggests job 
candidates use rejection to inform subsequent career decisions (Brands & Fernandez-Mateo, 
2016; Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015; Vough & Caza, 2017).  Specifically, we propose that 
unsuccessful internal candidates use three sources of information from the hiring process to 
assess their potential for future internal advancement: (1) whether the “winner” was an internal 
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or external candidate, (2) how far they progressed in the hiring process before rejection, and (3) 
how likely they were to be hired for the job.  Though employees may also rely on other sources 
in assessing their future career opportunities, these three sources are likely to provide particularly 
salient information to rejected candidates about “where they stand” in the organization relative to 
other candidates and how this might impact their chances of future internal mobility.  In the 
absence of perceived potential for future internal mobility opportunities, unsuccessful internal 
candidates are more likely to leave to pursue opportunities elsewhere.  Drawing on insights from 
the literatures on vacancy chains, social exchange, and expectancy violations, we suggest that 
that rejected internal candidates will perceive more chance for future internal mobility and 
therefore be less likely to voluntarily exit firms if: (1) the job is filled with another internal 
candidate, (2) they make it further in the hiring process before rejection, and (3) their initial 
expectations of being hired for the job are lower.   
Our hypotheses are largely supported through an analysis of more than 2,000 
unsuccessful internal candidates who applied for a new job within a large U.S. health services 
organization in 2012.  Rejected internal candidates are less likely to voluntarily exit the firm 
within a year if an internal rather than an external candidate is hired.  They are also less likely to 
voluntarily exit if interviewed by the hiring manager – the final step in the hiring process – as 
opposed to being rejected earlier.  Finally, unsuccessful internal candidates are less likely to 
leave when rejected for jobs for which they are likely to have lower expectations of being 
selected, including jobs that are less similar to their current job, jobs that represent advancements 
rather than lateral moves, jobs for which they do not match the incumbent gender profile, and 
more competitive job postings. 
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Together, our theory and findings provide three key contributions to our understanding of 
careers and career development within organizations.  First, by suggesting that unsuccessful 
internal candidates use rejection as a source of information regarding their future internal 
mobility, our work complements and extends previous theoretical approaches that focus on 
rejected candidates’ immediate reactions to rejection (i.e., Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004) and the 
narratives and stories they create about rejection (i.e., Vough & Caza, 2017).  Second, we 
integrate three theories to explain how rejected internal candidates interpret the different 
information sources and either continue to build their careers in ILMs or choose to leave.  Third, 
we employ a unique dataset that includes rich applicant and personnel records for each rejected 
internal candidate and the job postings they applied to, allowing us to track large-scale rejection 
within one organization. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Rejection and Information in Contemporary ILMs 
 In order to clearly develop our theoretical arguments and hypotheses, it is useful to first 
explain why employees are likely to use rejection as a source of information and how this 
information influences their perceptions of future internal mobility. 
 Existing research highlights many of the negative outcomes associated with rejection for 
internal candidates, particularly when they are denied promotions.   Many theoretical 
perspectives emphasize outcomes such as perceived unfairness and psychological contract 
violations (e.g., Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson, 1996), 
indicating that employees feel betrayed by their organizations when faced with rejection or feel 
that the organization has failed to fulfill its obligations.  Other perspectives and findings show 
that employees’ attitudes and behaviors are negatively altered following rejection, as they 
	 5 
experience decreases in satisfaction, commitment, and work engagement (Schwarzwald et al., 
1992), increased feelings of envy and social comparison with those who were promoted (Duffy, 
Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 2008; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004), and even increased counterproductive 
work behaviors such as property theft and negligence (Fine, Goldenberg, & Noam, 2016).  Still 
others suggest that employees see rejection for promotions as a career “shock” that causes them 
to look for alternatives outside the organization (i.e., Holtom et al., 2005; Lee & Mitchell, 1994).  
Though different, these perspectives share the underlying assumption that all internal candidates 
respond negatively to rejection. 
 We argue, however, that internal candidates are likely to respond differentially to 
rejection.  To build these arguments, we suggest that unsuccessful candidates use rejection as a 
source of information and interpret different aspects of rejection as positive or negative for their 
future mobility within organizations.  Recent research suggests that candidates do in fact use 
rejection as a source of information when making decisions about the future.  For example, 
Vough and Caza (2017) proposed that denied promotions initiate a sensemaking process from 
which employees try to understand why the denied promotion occurred and what its implications 
are moving forward in the organization, creating “stories” for themselves that may result in 
greater resilience and work engagement.  Likewise, Fernandez-Mateo and colleagues showed 
that executive candidates use rejection in previous interactions to determine their engagement in 
future interactions with search firms (Brands & Fernandez-Mateo, 2016; Fernandez-Mateo & 
Coh, 2015).  We similarly argue that rejected internal candidates interpret information sent by an 
organization’s hiring decisions to develop subjective inferences about employee career patterns 
(e.g., O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006), update their “cognitive maps” for future mobility, and assess 
whether there is a path for future internal mobility following a rejection. 
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The perspective that candidates use rejection as a source of information is especially 
relevant in contemporary ILMs where rejection is frequent and information about career paths 
can be difficult to come by.  Research shows that over 95% of organizations use job posting 
systems to fill jobs (Taleo Research, 2005).  With few restrictions as to who can apply for all 
jobs across the organization, job posting creates an internal market with increased competition 
and uncertainty.  While organizations may provide explanations to unsuccessful internal 
candidates for why they were not selected (Pinfield, 1995), candidates may discount this 
information if they feel the organization is simply providing excuses or justifying the rejection 
(i.e., Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979).  As a result, rejected internal candidates likely interpret for 
themselves why they were not chosen and assess their potential for future internal mobility after 
asking themselves three questions: “Who got hired?”, “How close was I to being hired?”, and 
“What were my expectations of being hired?”. 
Who Got Hired? 
 Previous work on rejection shows that candidates’ responses to being denied promotions 
may be affected by the attributes of the winner, such as perceived similarity of work experiences, 
job attitudes, and personality (i.e., Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004).  We extend this research by 
considering an additional attribute of selected candidates: whether they are internal or external 
candidates.  Despite evidence that external hires have lower initial performance and higher exit 
rates than internal movers (e.g., Bidwell, 2011), organizations increasingly rely on external 
hiring to fill jobs (Royal & Althauser, 2003).  In fact, internal mobility now competes with 
external hiring for nearly all jobs within an organization (Bidwell & Keller, 2014), and job 
posting systems make it easier for organizations to recruit both internal and external candidates 
for these jobs.  Theories of internal mobility and vacancy chains suggest that the ways in which 
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organizations choose to combine internal and external hiring provide particularly salient 
information to rejected internal candidates, especially regarding their potential for future internal 
mobility. 
 The literature on ILMs argues that opportunities for internal mobility act as an incentive 
to motivate workers (e.g., Chan, 1996).  Motivation to compete in these mobility contests is 
particularly strong if employees believe they will be selected if they perform well, and they 
assess their likelihood of success in competitions by looking at past mobility outcomes for 
themselves and others in the organization (Chan, 1996, 2006; Bidwell & Keller, 2014).  As 
internal employees gather and interpret information based on mobility outcomes for themselves 
and other internal candidates (i.e., O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006), they update their cognitive maps 
for internal mobility and their perceptions of internal career progress.  Successful internal 
mobility outcomes for internal employees in general may provide positive information about the 
possibility of continued internal mobility as their careers develop.  In other words, even if an 
internal candidate is rejected for a given job, if the job is filled by another internal candidate, he 
or she may still believe that continued performance and commitment to the organization will be 
rewarded in the future. 
 External hiring similarly provides the information about future opportunities within the 
organization.  The literature on vacancy chains – or a sequence of moves that a “vacancy” makes 
from initial entry into a system until final termination (Chase, 1991) – claims that certain job 
shifts create such opportunity structures (Rosenfeld, 1992; Stewman & Konda, 1983).  As 
workers move from one job to another within the organization, they create vacancies for other 
internal employees to fill.  Although the traditional vacancy chains research suggests that jobs 
are vertically linked and career progressions rather clear once a vacancy opens, the general 
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assumptions can be applied to contemporary ILMs as well: filling vacancies with internal hires 
creates opportunities for the movement of other internal employees, while external hires close 
opportunities.  Filling jobs with external rather than internal candidates may be therefore be 
particularly demotivating for rejected candidates as they update their cognitive maps for mobility.  
From a rejected internal candidate’s perspective, vacancies filled with external hires may hinder 
future internal mobility for themselves and other internal candidates more generally. 
Hypothesis 1: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if an 
external (internal) candidate is selected. 
How Close Was I to Being Hired? 
 Rejected internal candidates may also interpret how far they progressed in the hiring 
process to assess their future careers within the organization.  The typical hiring process involves 
multiple stages (e.g., multiple screenings, resume reviews, and interviews), and internal 
candidates interact with company representatives throughout these stages when they are 
considered for a new role within the organization (Breaugh, 2013).  Candidates may therefore be 
rejected at multiple stages, from the initial screening stages to the stage directly preceding a 
potential offer.  Theories of social exchange (e.g., Blau, 1964) and procedural justice (e.g., 
Colquitt et al., 2001) are particularly useful for understanding how unsuccessful internal 
candidates interpret rejection at these different stages. 
 There are reasons to expect that candidates may react negatively to being rejected at both 
the early and later stages of the hiring process.  On one hand, getting closer to an outcome in a 
process or competition before rejection may be more disappointing for individuals than if they 
had simply been rejected earlier in the process or had not “almost won.”  For example, social and 
cognitive psychology studies testing theories of counterfactual thinking have shown that winning 
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a silver medal is perceived as less satisfying than winning a bronze medal (Medvec, Madey, & 
Gilovich, 1995).  Similarly, individuals who miss their plane by five minutes are generally more 
upset than those who miss their plane by thirty minutes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  “Coming 
close” is particularly upsetting because it is easy to imagine the counterfactual – or what might 
have happened – had the silver medalist swam a little faster or the traveler arrived slightly earlier.  
Those who come closer to winning but finish second focus more on the fact that they lost and 
should have won than on the fact that they almost won – and are ultimately less satisfied with the 
final result (Medvec et al., 1995). 
 These findings suggest that getting further in the hiring process (i.e., going through 
multiple rounds of interviews and then being rejected closer to when an offer would be made) 
may be especially upsetting for candidates who have applied to jobs and are unsuccessful.  In 
fact, Fernandez-Mateo and Coh (2015) found that rejected external executive candidates 
experienced more negative affect and were less likely to engage in future interactions following 
rejection at a later stage in the hiring process than if they were rejected early.  This is especially 
likely in the external market; as candidates progress through the hiring process, they become 
more invested in being selected for the position and the possibility of starting in a new 
organization (i.e. Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015).  If rejected later in the process, candidates 
may feel as if the organization “dragged them along.”  Prolonged rejection may provide 
information that the organization does not value them or their desire to find employment 
elsewhere in a timely manner, and external candidates are likely to feel as though they have 
wasted their time if rejected later rather than sooner. 
 We expect these dynamics to play out differently within the firm, however, as getting 
further in the hiring process before rejection may provide information that is interpreted 
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differently by internal candidates.  Unlike external candidates who might have little or no prior 
relationship with the organization, internal candidates have established patterns of exchange with 
their firms.  According to social exchange theory, the relationships between organizations and 
their employees evolve over time through multiple interactions under certain norms (Blau, 1964).  
These relationships continue to develop when both parties engage in “advantageous and fair” 
transactions and behaviors that show they value their exchange with the other (Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005).  For example, a high-performing internal employee who values his company 
may choose to apply for another job within that company.  If this internal candidate gets further 
in the hiring process before he is rejected, this might provide information that his application was 
seriously considered by the organization – information that high performance and commitment is 
valued and reciprocated with due consideration when internal candidates apply to new jobs. 
 More specifically, if candidates make it far enough in the hiring process that they are able 
to interview with hiring managers, they should not only feel that their application was taken 
seriously, but that someone involved in the hiring process took the time to meet with and 
consider them fully.  Because internal employees are more invested in their companies than 
external candidates and perhaps more aware of selection processes (i.e., Truxillo, Bauer, & 
McCarthy, 2015), they may hold perceptions that scheduling interviews with internal candidates 
is simple and fair.  In line with the literature on procedural justice – or the fairness of the process 
by which a decision is made (Colquitt et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; 
Konovsky, 2000) – meeting face-to-face with candidates (rather than only interviewing over the 
phone or rejecting them in the initial stages of the hiring process) likely indicates that more 
accurate information was available and used to make a hiring decision.  Moreover, a thorough 
review and rejection at a later stage could suggest that the rejected candidate was well-qualified 
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from the organization’s perspective (i.e., Markman & Tetlock, 2000).  Such information likely 
causes unsuccessful internal candidates to update their cognitive maps and think positively about 
their future advancement to additional internal roles despite rejection. 
 We therefore suggest that unsuccessful internal candidates are more likely to perceive 
paths for future mobility when they are rejected at later (as opposed to earlier) stages in the 
hiring process.  Internal candidates who have established relationships with their organizations 
are less likely to feel that the organization wasted their time and more likely to feel like they 
were given a legitimate and fair chance of being selected.  Getting further in the process may 
therefore also provide information that, although rejected for this position, they were strong 
candidates with the potential for future internal mobility opportunities.  Internal candidates 
rejected earlier in the hiring process, on the other hand, may not perceive the same potential for 
their careers, and may choose to leave. 
Hypothesis 2: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if they 
are rejected earlier (later) in the hiring process. 
What Were My Expectations of Being Hired? 
 Whereas the two previous sources of information more directly involve the job posting 
process specific to each candidate, rejected internal candidates may also gain information about 
their future careers by considering how likely they were to get the job in the first place.  If 
candidates expect that they are more likely to be selected for a position, rejection may not only 
disrupt current expectations but may also affect expectations for future internal mobility.  In 
other words, candidates rejected for a position they perceived they were likely to be hired for 
might then perceive an even lower chance of future moves into positions for which they have 
equal or lower expectations of being hired.  Although internal candidates may form expectations 
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based on many different sources of fit and information for a given job, we focus on four sources 
in particular: (a) how similar the job is to their current job, (b) whether the job is an advancement 
or a transfer, (c) demographic similarity with the current incumbents in the job, and (d) amount 
of competition for the job.  Drawing on insights from expectancy violations theory, we suggest 
that internal candidates use these four pieces of information when developing expectations for 
how likely they are to be hired for a position and updating their cognitive maps for future 
internal mobility following rejection. 
According to Burgoon (1978), expectancy violation broadly refers to when an individual 
anticipates what will happen in a given situation and expectations of outcomes are not met.  
Individuals then shift their attention to the meaning of the violation and why the violation 
occurred.  In the context of internal hiring, candidates may experience expectancy violations 
when rejected for jobs they believe they are more likely to be hired for, while rejection for jobs 
they believe they are less likely to be hired for has less of an effect.  When rejected for jobs that 
they feel they are more likely to be hired for, like jobs that are similar to their current job or jobs 
for which they “fit,” candidates may perceive less chance of future mobility into jobs that are 
equally or potentially less similar.  This may result in voluntary exit from the organization. 
 Job applicants often form perceptions about their fit with particular jobs and 
organizations during the recruiting process (Cable & Judge, 1994, 1996).  Although internal 
candidates applying to new jobs likely feel that they are a good fit with their organization, they 
may still assess whether their abilities are congruent with those required for the demands of the 
new job.  One way internal candidates may assess their demands-abilities fit with new jobs 
within the organization is by comparing the demands of such jobs with those of their current jobs.  
If jobs are relatively similar in terms of required skills and competencies, internal candidates 
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likely perceive greater congruence and fit and may develop stronger expectations that they will 
be selected for such positions.  Unsuccessful internal candidates who have demonstrated that 
they possess the skills and competencies to successfully work in certain jobs may experience 
expectancy violations following rejection and, again, perceive much less chance of mobility into 
equally similar or more dissimilar jobs within the organization in the future. 
Hypothesis 3a: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if 
rejected for a job that is similar to (different from) their current job (controlling for 
performance). 
Similarly, while internal moves such as promotions or expansions involve an increase in 
job responsibilities, transfers are more akin to lateral moves with equivalent levels of 
responsibility but in different functions or departments.  Internal candidates can therefore form 
similar perceptions of fit and expectations of being hired based on whether they are applying for 
advancements (i.e., promotions or expansions) or transfers.  Assuming that internal candidates 
have higher expectations of being selected for transfers rather than promotions or expansions, 
rejection for such positions results in an expectancy violation.  Additionally, if internal 
candidates are rejected for transfers into jobs with comparable levels of responsibilities, rejection 
may signal that future mobility into jobs with equal or greater responsibility is less of a 
possibility as well, which may result in voluntary turnover. 
Hypothesis 3b: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if 
rejected for a job that is a transfer (advancement) (controlling for performance). 
Although previous fit literature has demonstrated that demographic fit may be less 
important for fit perceptions than, for example, demands-abilities fit or value congruence (Saks 
& Ashforth, 1997, 2002), demographic attributes may still be powerful determinants of similarity 
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and fit perceptions (Jackson et al., 1991).  Again, this may be especially true for internal 
candidates who already perceive strong fit with their organization but are looking to move into 
new jobs.  While internal candidates who are the same gender and race as the majority of 
incumbents currently working in the jobs they are applying to may therefore perceive greater 
organizational fit perceptions, their expectations of being hired for a specific job may be 
enhanced due to the organization’s prior decisions to select employees who are demographically 
similar for such roles (i.e., O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006).  For example, if a female candidate 
recognizes that the job she is applying to is mainly occupied by other female workers, she may 
expect the organization to be more likely to continue hiring female workers like herself.  If 
rejected for a job she seems an ideal demographic fit for, however, her expectations are not met.  
She may interpret her chances of moving into other female-dominated jobs in the future as slim 
and movement into male-dominated jobs even less likely, leading her to leave the organization.  
Conversely, if she applies to a job that is made up of a relatively equal number of male and 
female incumbents, she likely will not have strong expectations of getting the job based on 
demographic fit.  She may therefore be less likely to experience an expectancy violation and less 
likely to interpret rejection as negative for her future internal mobility. 
Hypothesis 3c: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if 
rejected for a job dominated by workers of the same (different) gender or minority status. 
Finally, in addition to various degrees of fit, rejected internal candidates may consider 
whether the job they applied to was more or less competitive when interpreting rejection 
information.  As mentioned above, internal mobility acts as an incentive to motivate workers, but 
workers are even more motivated to compete if there are few competitors (Chan, 1996).  This is 
because there is a greater probability of winning the competition, and internal candidates’ 
	 15 
incentive to exert effort and compete comes with the expectation that they have a stronger 
chance of being selected when applying alongside few competitors.  A greater number of 
competitors, however, reduces expectations of being hired.  If internal candidates are rejected for 
positions for which there are few competitors, their initial expectations about their chances of 
being selected are violated, while rejection for more competitive jobs is potentially anticipated.  
Rejection from these less competitive jobs may signal that rejected internal candidate have fewer 
opportunities for future internal mobility, particularly for jobs that are more competitive, and 
they may therefore be more likely to leave.  
Hypothesis 3d: A rejected internal candidate is more (less) likely to voluntarily exit if 
rejected for a job that has less (more) competition. 
DATA 
 We test these hypotheses using two data sources from a large US health services 
company which we call HealthCo.  The first source contains information on each unsuccessful 
internal application submitted to an internal job posting (or requisition) in 2012.  This data 
includes information on the job applied for, information on the “winning” candidates (those 
candidates who were selected), and information on how far in the hiring process the candidate 
progressed before rejection.  The second source consists of annual personnel records of the 
internal candidates and includes detailed demographic, pay, and performance information.  
Rejected internal candidates represent employees at all levels of HealthCo. 
 We examine rejected internal candidates who applied to one job posting and those job 
postings for which there was only one winner.  Although candidates may submit more than one 
application to more than one job using HealthCo’s job posting system, it is not clear that internal 
candidates who apply to one job in a year (11% of all job postings) respond to rejection in the 
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same way as those who apply to more than one at different points throughout the year or choose 
to submit multiple applications for many jobs at once.  In both cases, it is difficult to disentangle 
how their experiences across applications – and rejections – affect their decision to exit.  
Similarly, although some jobs may be filled with multiple hires, rejected internal candidates may 
be most able to think about their prospects for future mobility when jobs have only one winner 
(81% of all requisitions).  This is particularly true for tests of our first hypothesis.  Limiting the 
data to rejected internal candidates who applied for only one position in 2012 and single-hire 
requisitions leaves a sample of 2,370 rejected internal candidates.  The full dataset includes one 
row per rejected internal candidate, matched with data on the hired candidate and data on the 
specific job posting, explained in more detail below. 
Internal Candidate Variables 
Voluntary exit.  Voluntary exit is the dependent variable in all models presented.  We 
observe whether they chose to leave HealthCo in 2013.1  Voluntary exit is coded as 1 if rejected 
internal candidates voluntarily exited HealthCo within this time period and 0 if rejected 
candidates did not voluntarily exit the organization during this time.2  
Internal winner.  We use the application records to determine whether the hired 
candidate was an internal or external candidate.  Hires who are internal candidates are coded 1, 
while hires who are external candidates are coded 0. 
 Rejection stage.  HealthCo’s application records also give us information on how far 
each candidate progressed in the hiring process before being rejected.  There are six stages in the 
hiring process at HealthCo from the candidate’s perspective: a pre-screening of applicants, an 																																																								1	This time frame was chosen so that internal candidates would have adequate time to process being rejected and 
their potential for future mobility, consider alternative options outside of the organization should they perceive less 2	The data on turnover for this organization is collected in such a way that we are able to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary turnover from the company’s personnel records.	
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initial HR phone interview, a hiring manager interview, the offer (should candidates be selected), 
a post-offer stage (for background checks, etc.), and a final hiring stage.  Candidates’ last steps 
before rejection are recorded in the application records based on these six stages.  Although 
successful candidates would experience all six stages, rejected candidates are not given offers.  
They therefore only experience three stages in the hiring process: the pre-screen, the HR phone 
interview, and the hiring manager interview. 
 Although we could code rejection stage as three separate stages (e.g., 0 = pre-screen, 1 = 
HR phone interview, 2 = hiring manager interview), we chose to code rejection stage as a 
dichotomous variable (where 0 = pre-screen or HR phone interview and 1 = hiring manager 
interview).  As we argue above, rejected internal candidates are most likely to feel their 
application was considered fully and perceive the most potential for future mobility if someone 
involved in the hiring process takes the time to meet with them.  While candidates speak with a 
representative from HR during the phone interview, the hiring manager decides who should fill 
the job and is an important interview from the candidate’s perspective (Breaugh, 2013).  We 
therefore believe coding rejection stage as a dichotomous variable is most conceptually 
appropriate.  
Job Posting Variables 
 Job similarity.  Because we are able to match the data on each job posting to each 
rejected candidate and his or her personnel records, we are able to identify how similar an 
candidate’s current job was to the job they applied to.  Each job at HealthCo is assigned a unique 
combination of eight competencies against which employees’ performance is evaluated.  We are 
able to compare the competencies of each job, and calculate the number of overlapping 
competencies for candidates’ current jobs and the jobs for which they were rejected.  From this, 
	 18 
we grouped the number of overlapping competencies to create a job similarity variable that is 
consistent with how employees at HealthCo view similarities between jobs.  This variable is 
coded 0 if the job candidates were rejected for is much less similar to their current job (0 to 4 
overlapping competencies), coded 1 if the job they were rejected for is more similar to their 
current job (5 to 7 overlapping competencies), and coded 2 if the job they applied to has 8 
competencies overlapping with their current job – essentially an identical job in terms of 
necessary competencies as defined by the organization.  Competencies are listed in the job 
descriptions at HealthCo, allowing candidates to make comparisons between the competencies of 
their current job and those of the job they choose to apply to. 
 Advancement.  An attempted move (i.e., an internal candidates’s attempt to move from 
their current job to another job within the organization) is defined as an advancement if the move 
would have resulted in a promotion or expansion.  We group promotions and expansions 
together as advancements to more accurately describe how employees and managers think about 
advancement within HealthCo as well as other contemporary ILMs.  Though a promotion 
involves an advancement upward in the hierarchy, an expansion is a move to a job in the same 
hierarchical level but with substantially more responsibility and an increase in salary.  An 
attempted transfer, on the other hand, occurs when an internal candidate applies for a similar job 
in a different department or function but does not include an increase in responsibility or an 
increase in pay.  Advancement is coded 1 if the attempted move was a promotion or expansion 
and coded 0 if the attempted move was a transfer. 
Incumbent gender and minority profile.  By incumbent gender and minority profile, we 
mean the percentage of female and percentage of minority (non-White) incumbent employees 
working in the jobs internal candidates applied to.  Because candidates applied to these jobs in 
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2012, we use the percentage of female and percentage of minority incumbents from the year 
2011, as employees may be most likely to consider the proportion of women and minority 
members in a given job in the full year preceding their application when assessing the likelihood 
that they will be hired.  This is consistent with our argument that internal employees update their 
cognitive maps for mobility based on the organizations past hiring decisions. 
 Competition.  From the internal applicant records, we are able to calculate how many 
candidates (both internal and external) applied and were rejected for a specific job posting 
alongside the rejected internal candidates.  Though it is unlikely that rejected candidates would 
be aware of how many external candidates apply, they are likely aware of how many other 
internal candidates apply for jobs.  Our measure of internal competition is thus the total number 
of internal applications for each job posting.  In the models testing this variable, we control for 
total number of applicants for each posting as well (total number of internal and external), as 
doing so is more indicative of the actual level of competition for each job posting. 
Control Variables  
 From the personnel records we control for a number of variables that are likely to be 
associated with turnover.  We specifically control for demographic variables such as rejected 
candidates’ gender and racial minority status, along with their most recent performance rating, 
current job level, and salary.  Although HealthCo does not record years of education or highest 
degree completed, we are able to calculate firm tenure based on their initial hire date.  We also 
include controls for unemployment rate in rejected candidates’ individual counties in 2012 as 
well as the average rate of turnover for candidates’ current jobs at the time of application. 
Additionally, because previous research shows that rejected candidates’ perceptions of 
similarity with the selected candidate may affect their responses to rejection (e.g., Schaubroeck 
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& Lam, 2004), we created variables indicating whether the rejected and selected candidate were 
the same gender and the same ethnicity.  Though we do not include job-related similarity 
variables, which would only apply for requisitions where another internal candidate is hired, we 
explore these effects in supplementary analyses. 
METHOD AND RESULTS 
 Given that the dependent variable voluntary exit is binary, we use logistic regression to 
test our hypotheses and interpret the results in odds ratios.  We are most interested in whether the 
different information sources gained from rejection are associated with voluntary turnover in the 
year following rejection, rather than the amount of time before rejected internal candidates leave 
or which pieces of information gained from rejection predict earlier or later voluntary turnover.  
Additionally, because of the way this organization documents voluntary exit for employees, we 
have complete information on internal candidates’ exit years and exit months.  This creates more 
overlapping “ties,” or a large number of events that overlap at particular intervals.  We do not 
have complete information on their specific exit dates, which are ideal for methods such as Cox 
regression (Allison, 2010; Singer & Willett, 2003).  For these reasons, we believe logistic 
regression is better suited for our analyses than survival analysis.3 
 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the analyses.  
Some key takeaways are that jobs were filled with internal candidates for over 70% of job 
postings, only about 21% of internal candidates were interviewed by hiring managers, and over 
85% of candidates were applying for advancements rather than transfers.  The models for all 
hypotheses are presented in Table 2.  Model 1 includes all control variables that may affect 
voluntary exit in addition to our hypothesized variables.  The odds ratios for tenure and 																																																								3	In general, however, logistic regression and survival analysis (using exit months rather than exact exit dates) 
yielded similar results in terms of effect significance.  Analyses available upon request.	
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performance rating are below 1.00 (p < .001 and p < .10, respectively), indicating that candidates 
who have been with the organization longer and those with higher performance ratings are 
generally less likely to leave following rejection.
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among main study variables 
 
  VARIABLES                            Mean          S.D. 1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9              10              11            12            13            14            15            16            17            18 
   
 
1. Voluntary exit       0.09          0.29                1.00  
 
2. Female loser        0.72          0.45                 0.01        1.00  
 
3. Minority loser        0.32          0.47                 0.05         0.05         1.00  
 
4. Tenure (ln)       1.77          0.67                -0.15         0.10        -0.09       1.00  
 
5. Salary (ln)                         10.80          0.41                -0.07        -0.13        -0.22       0.26  1.00  
 
6. Recent performance rating  2.46          0.54                -0.12          0.01        -0.08        0.38   0.20         1.00  
 
7. County unemployment rate  7.64          0.86                -0.02         -0.06         0.16       -0.07  -0.01         0.04         1.00  
 
8. Average exit rate by job  8.89          4.85                 0.11           0.03         0.17      -0.28  -0.38        -0.13        -0.05        1.00  
 
9. Same gender        0.65          0.48                 0.03           0.33         0.02      -0.01  -0.02        -0.03        -0.04        0.02    1.00  
 
10. Same ethnicity        0.61          0.49                -0.03          -0.03       -0.45       0.09   0.12          0.08        -0.05       -0.11   -0.02         1.00  
 
11. Internal winner       0.72          0.45                -0.07           0.00       -0.14        0.11   0.00          0.06        -0.05       -0.11   -0.00          0.02         1.00  
 
12. Hiring manager interview  0.21          0.41                -0.06          -0.03       -0.10        0.02   0.04          0.04        -0.06       -0.05    0.02          0.06          0.11        1.00  
 
13. Job similarity        0.65          0.70                 0.05           0.06        0.02       -0.11  -0.06         -0.09       -0.01         0.05     0.05        -0.02        -0.12        0.09        1.00 
 
14. Advancement (v. transfer)  0.87          0.34                -0.08          -0.03        0.01        0.10  -0.06          0.07         0.03        -0.02    -0.05        -0.03         0.11       -0.06       -0.75   1.00  
 
15. Gender profile (% female)                      69.97        18.89 0.01           0.30         0.08      -0.08  -0.39         -0.11       -0.09         0.18     0.09        -0.07        -0.04       -0.01        0.14  -0.08        1.00  
 
16. Minority profile (% minority)                 29.30        15.99 0.03           0.04         0.22      -0.18  -0.34         -0.09         0.03        0.23    -0.02        -0.16        -0.16       -0.04        0.19  -0.09        0.23        1.00  
 
17. # Internal applicants (ln)  2.36          0.97                -0.04           0.04       -0.04        0.07  -0.19         -0.03         0.11        0.00    -0.01        -0.08         0.37       -0.06       -0.11   0.14         0.07       -0.06        1.00 
            
18. # Total applicants       3.60          1.08 0.03           0.03         0.13      -0.09  -0.09         -0.11         0.15        0.14     0.04        -0.11         -0.31      -0.21        0.02   0.02         0.13        0.12         0.44        1.00 
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Table 2. Odds of voluntary turnover in the year following a rejection 
         
VARIABLES Model 1 
 



















 (0.143) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) (0.142) (0.250) (0.183) (0.145) 
Minority loser 1.263 1.194 1.220 1.246 1.253 1.297 1.708 1.184 
 (0.238) (0.228) (0.230) (0.235) (0.236) (0.254) (0.634) (0.229) 
Tenure (ln) 0.646** 0.651** 0.643** 0.654** 0.658** 0.593*** 0.577*** 0.664** 
 (0.0972) (0.0974) (0.0976) (0.0986) (0.0991) (0.0938) (0.0919) (0.0999) 
Salary (ln) 0.801 0.785 0.785 0.778 0.803 0.747 0.861 0.753 
 (0.268) (0.265) (0.261) (0.257) (0.271) (0.288) (0.338) (0.252) 
Recent performance rating 0.703* 0.714* 0.713* 0.714* 0.713* 0.695* 0.701* 0.703* 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107) (0.102) 
County unemployment rate 0.852+ 0.846+ 0.843+ 0.855+ 0.856+ 0.912 0.917 0.863 
 (0.0797) (0.0783) (0.0790) (0.0800) (0.0807) (0.0901) (0.0894) (0.0816) 
Average exit rate by job 1.060*** 1.056*** 1.059*** 1.058*** 1.059*** 1.046** 1.050** 1.056*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0160) 
Same gender 1.297 1.286 1.313 1.288 1.288 1.219 1.310 1.283 
 (0.215) (0.213) (0.218) (0.215) (0.215) (0.221) (0.231) (0.213) 
Same ethnicity 1.058 1.032 1.056 1.032 1.047 1.011 1.015 1.025 
 (0.189) (0.183) (0.187) (0.185) (0.187) (0.189) (0.190) (0.184) 
Internal winner  0.687*       
  (0.106)       
Hiring manager interview   0.581*      
   (0.123)      
Similar job    0.804     
    (0.136)     
Same job    1.505*     
    (0.309)     
Advancement (v. transfer)     0.595**    
     (0.113)    
% Female      0.987+   
      (0.00674)   
Female loser x % Female      1.014   
      (0.00930)   
% Minority       0.997  
       (0.00682)  
Minority loser x % Minority       0.992  
       (0.00967)  
# Internal applicants (ln)        0.840* 
        (0.0746) 
# Total applicants (ln)        1.081 
        (0.0832) 
Constant 22.83 41.54 33.79 29.99 31.42 113.9 9.696 46.84 
 (91.56) (168.6) (135.4) (118.8) (127.6) (531.7) (45.03) (187.7) 
         
Observations 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,245 2,245 2,370 
Note: Controls for losers’ current job level included but not shown 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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We argued in Hypothesis 1 that rejected internal candidates would be more likely to 
voluntarily exit if an external candidate is hired and less likely to voluntarily exit if an internal 
candidate is hired.  We find support for this hypothesis.  The odds ratio for internal winner in 
Model 2 is significant (p < 0.05); the odds of voluntary turnover decrease by a factor of 0.69 (or 
roughly 30%) if the organization hires another internal candidate.  Alternatively, the odds of 
rejected candidate turnover increase by a factor of 1.46 when an external candidate is hired. 
 We argued in Hypothesis 2 that unsuccessful internal candidates would be more likely to 
voluntarily exit if rejected earlier in the hiring process and less likely to voluntarily exit if 
rejected later in the hiring process.  In other words, we argue that candidates are less likely to 
leave if they are interviewed by a hiring manager, which is the furthest stage in the hiring process 
a candidate can progress before being offered a job.  As shown in Model 3, the odds ratio for 
hiring manager interview is significant (p < 0.05); the odds of turnover decrease by a factor of 
0.58 (or roughly 42%) if candidates get as far as possible in the hiring process before rejection 
and are interviewed by a hiring manager – someone involved in the decision process.  Stated 
differently, the odds of turnover increase by a factor of 1.72 if they are rejected at an earlier stage 
in the hiring process (i.e., after the prescreen or phone interview stage).  We therefore find 
support for Hypothesis 2. 
 Models 4 through 8 present the results for Hypotheses 3a through 3d – the hypotheses 
that internal candidates are more likely to voluntarily exit when rejected for a job that they may 
expect to be more likely to get.  We used four different variables to test the individual 
hypotheses: job similarity, advancement versus transfer, incumbent gender (percent female) and 
minority (percent minority) profile, and amount of internal competition.  In Hypothesis 3a, we 
argued that internal candidates would be more likely to leave when rejected for a job that was 	
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similar to their current job (in terms of overlapping competencies).  The odds ratios for the 
dummy-coded job similarity variables in Model 4 are non-significant and significant (p = .20, p 
< .05, respectively).  There is no significant difference in the odds of turnover when internal 
candidates are rejected for jobs that are quite different (only 0-4 overlapping competencies) as 
opposed to jobs that are more similar (5-7 overlapping competencies).  However, when rejected 
for jobs that are essentially identical to their current job as opposed to jobs that are quite different 
(jobs that share 8 competencies as opposed to 0-4 competencies), the odds of turnover increase 
by a factor of 1.51 (or roughly 51%).  Hypothesis 3a was therefore supported. 
 We argued in Hypothesis 3b that internal candidates are more likely to leave when 
rejected for a job that is a transfer (as opposed to a job that is an advancement).  The odds ratio 
for advancement in Model 5 is significant (p < .001); the odds of turnover decrease by a factor of 
0.60 (or roughly 40%) if they are rejected for a job that is an advancement (i.e., a job that is a 
promotion or expansion from their current job) as opposed to a transfer.  The odds of turnover 
increase by a factor of 1.68 if they are rejected for a job that is considered a transfer.  Hypothesis 
3b was therefore supported. 
 Hypothesis 3c argued that internal candidates are more likely to leave when rejected for a 
job where they match the incumbent profile in terms of gender and minority status.  We do not 
find support for this hypothesis.  As shown in Model 6, the odds ratio for the interaction between 
female candidate and gender profile (percentage of female incumbents in the job they applied to) 
is not significant (p = .12); for every unit (1%) increase in the percent of female workers 
employed in the requisition job, there appears to be no effect on the odds of female or male 
candidate turnover.  The odds ratio for the minority profile interaction coefficient in Model 7 is 
also not significant (p = .45); there is no effect on the odds of minority candidate turnover for 
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every unit (1%) increase in the percent of minority workers employed in the requisition job.  
Neither minority nor non-minority (White) candidates are more or less likely to exit when 
rejected for a job that is largely dominated by minority workers. 
 We argued in Hypothesis 3d that internal candidates are more likely to voluntarily exit 
the organization when they are rejected for a job that has less internal competition.  Model 8 
includes the odds ratio for the natural log of number of other internal applicants as well as a 
variable controlling for the natural log of the total number of applicants per job posting.  The 
odds ratio is marginally significant (p = .05); for every unit increase in internal competition, the 
odds of turnover decrease by a factor of 0.84.  This indicates that internal candidates may be less 
likely to leave when rejected for jobs for which there is more internal competition and more 
likely to leave when rejected for a job that is less competitive. However, because the effect is 
marginal, we cannot conclusively say Hypothesis 3d is supported. 
Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses 
 We ran a number of robustness checks as well as analyses to supplement our original 
models and tease apart certain effects, including effects for our incumbent profile variables and 
effects for job-related similarity of rejected and selected candidates for requisitions where 
another internal candidate was hired. 
Candidate performance.  We first ran analyses to examine how rejected candidates’ 
performance ratings are associated with voluntary turnover.  Although we control for 
performance ratings in all of our original models, we then interacted each of our key variables 
with rejected candidate performance to examine whether high- versus low-performing candidates 
are more likely to voluntarily exit following a rejection.  Hiring managers may reject low-
performing candidates as a way to signal that they are not likely to advance and, in doing so, 
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encourage functional turnover to benefit the organization.  However, given the increased 
competition across jobs in contemporary ILMs, it is likely that not all rejected candidates are low 
performers.  Some may be particularly high performers that were not selected for specific jobs 
but that the organization does not want to lose.  As shown in Table 3, the majority of the odds 
ratios for all interactions were not significant, indicating that, at least at HealthCo, low 
performers are not significantly more likely than high performers to leave after being rejected.  
Stated differently, high-performers may be just as likely as low performers to voluntarily exit if 
they are rejected and perceive few opportunities for future internal mobility.  This suggests that 
organizations should not disregard rejected internal candidates as low performers whose exit 
would be inconsequential.  In fact, the effect for the interaction between internal winner and 
performance rating is significant and in the expected direction (p < .05); high-performing 
rejected internal candidates may actually be less likely to exit when an internal candidate is hired 
and more likely to voluntarily exit when an external candidate is hired.
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Table 3. Odds of voluntary turnover in the year following rejection – Robustness checks for employee performance 
        
VARIABLES Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
Female loser 0.840 0.817 0.804 0.813 0.035 0.961 0.834 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.089) (0.183) (0.145) 
Minority loser 1.187 1.218 1.250 1.253 1.305 0.436 1.171 
 (0.228) (0.230) (0.235) (0.236) (0.256) (0.619) (0.227) 
Tenure (ln) 0.649** 0.646** 0.659** 0.658** 0.593*** 0.581*** 0.662** 
 (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.094) (0.092) (0.099) 
Salary (ln) 0.818 0.774 0.781 0.803 0.731 0.867 0.777 
 (0.277) (0.258) (0.265) (0.271) (0.279) (0.346) (0.260) 
County unemployment rate 0.844+ 0.841+ 0.871 0.856+ 0.908 0.901 0.861 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) (0.090) (0.089) (0.081) 
Average exit rate by job 1.056*** 1.059*** 1.059*** 1.059*** 1.046** 1.046** 1.054*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Same gender 1.269 1.316+ 1.319 1.287 1.203 1.321 1.279 
 (0.210) (0.219) (0.222) (0.215) (0.217) (0.236) (0.212) 
Same ethnicity 1.034 1.049 1.053 1.048 0.995 1.026 1.023 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187) (0.195) (0.184) 
Recent performance rating 0.959 0.682* 0.714 0.738 0.417 0.727 1.105 
 (0.202) (0.104) (0.200) (0.217) (0.281) (0.274) (0.367) 
Internal winner 2.116       
 (1.239)       
Internal winner x Recent performance rating 0.612*       
 (0.150)       
Hiring manager interview  0.233      
  (0.236)      
Hiring manager interview x Recent performance rating  1.468      
  (0.600)      
Similar job   1.039     
   (1.271)     
Same job   0.549     
   (0.387)     
Similar job x Recent performance rating   0.816     
   (0.420)     
Same job x Recent performance rating   1.010     
   (0.304)     
Advancement (v. transfer)    0.658    
    (0.475)    
Advancement x Recent performance rating    0.957    
    (0.296)    
% Female     0.976   
     (0.025)   
% Female x Female loser      1.040   
     (0.037)   
% Female x Female loser x Recent performance rating     0.990   
     (0.014)   
% Minority      1.018  
      (0.026)  
% Minority x Minority loser      0.990  
      (0.036)  
% Minority x Minority loser x Recent performance rating      1.002  
      (0.016)  
# Other internal applicants (ln)       1.326 
       (0.404) 
# Other internal applicants (ln) x Recent performance rating       0.818 
       (0.105) 
# Total applications (ln)       1.085 
       (0.083) 
Constant 13.674 44.554 34.071 29.253 497.932 9.897 11.807 
 (56.014) (178.424) (137.505) (119.520) (2,500.623) (49.536) (48.352) 
Observations 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,245 2,245 2,370 
Note: Controls for losers’ current job level included but not shown 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Attempted transfers versus attempted advancements.  In addition to robustness checks 
for performance, we explored an alternative explanation for our hypothesis related to 
expectations of being hired for advancements versus transfers (Hypothesis 3b).  At HealthCo and 
many other organizations, advancements and transfers are both considered important ways in 
which individuals build their careers (i.e., Bidwell & Mollick, 2015).  Advancements typically 
involve an increase in responsibilities and salary; transfers allow employees to move within the 
same level but gain experience and expand their skills in a new job function or department.  
Although we argue that internal candidates form different expectations of being hired based on 
these two types of attempted moves in general, it is also possible that they apply for transfers for 
reasons other than career advancement, such as a conflict with a manager and/or co-workers or a 
desire for geographic relocation.  In theses cases, they may be more likely to leave following 
rejection regardless of the information provided from the hiring process about their potential for 
future internal mobility.  While we cannot directly test this alternative explanation with our data, 
we reran all original models (excluding Hypothesis 3b) controlling for whether the candidates’ 
attempted moves were advancements or transfers.  As shown in Table 4, our original results hold, 
with the exception of those for our hypothesis related to job similarity.  However, because 
advancements are likely to have far fewer overlapping competencies with rejected candidates’ 
current jobs, it is not surprising that this effect is no longer significant.
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Table 4. Odds of voluntary turnover in the year following rejection – Robustness checks for move type 
       
VARIABLES Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Female loser 0.820 0.805 0.818 0.446 0.952 0.818 
 (0.144) (0.141) (0.143) (0.283) (0.183) (0.144) 
Minority loser 1.192 1.204 1.247 1.292 1.784 1.184 
 (0.227) (0.227) (0.236) (0.253) (0.663) (0.228) 
Tenure (ln) 0.663** 0.656** 0.655** 0.605** 0.586*** 0.675** 
 (0.0997) (0.0997) (0.0990) (0.0961) (0.0937) (0.102) 
Salary (ln) 0.789 0.791 0.752 0.747 0.871 0.760 
 (0.268) (0.266) (0.254) (0.289) (0.345) (0.257) 
Recent performance rating 0.720* 0.723* 0.711* 0.707* 0.719* 0.711* 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.107) (0.110) (0.104) 
County unemployment rate 0.850+ 0.846+ 0.858 0.914 0.925 0.864 
 (0.0793) (0.0799) (0.0811) (0.0910) (0.0915) (0.0828) 
Average exit rate by job 1.055*** 1.058*** 1.059*** 1.046** 1.050** 1.056*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0160) 
Same gender 1.279 1.302 1.293 1.222 1.298 1.277 
 (0.214) (0.219) (0.216) (0.224) (0.232) (0.214) 
Same ethnicity 1.022 1.045 1.039 0.993 0.996 1.019 
 (0.181) (0.185) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.183) 
Advancement (v. transfer) 0.615* 0.569** 0.563 0.560** 0.530** 0.615* 





     
Hiring manager interview  0.556**     
  (0.119)     
Similar job   0.806    
   (0.136)    
Same job   0.853    
   (0.801)    
% Female    0.986*   
    (0.00683)   
Female loser x % Female    1.013   
    (0.00940)   
% Minority     0.995  
     (0.00691)  
Minority loser x % Minority     0.991  
     (0.00964)  
# Internal applicants (ln)      0.857+ 
      (0.0759) 
# Total applicants (ln)      1.079 
      (0.0833) 
Constant 53.38 45.75 78.52 170.4 12.81 57.75 
 (219.0) (185.8) (336.1) (803.7) (60.24) (234.1) 
       
Observations 2,370 2,370 2,370 2,245 2,245 2,370 
Note: Controls for losers’ current job level included but not shown 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Demographic characteristics of the winning candidate.  Although we argued that being 
rejected for a job with a larger number of similar-gender and similar-minority status incumbents 
would be associated with voluntary exit, we do not find support for this hypothesis while 
controlling for whether the winning candidate was the same gender or same ethnicity.  However, 
because we suggested that internal candidates who “matched” the incumbent pool of the job they 
applied to would experience expectancy violations following rejection for said job, we also 
wanted to examine whether the gender and minority status of the winning candidate affected 
turnover.  To explore this, we first ran analyses including all requisitions for which a female 
candidate was hired and all requisitions for which a male was hired.  We then repeated these 
analyses including all requisitions for which a minority (non-White) candidate was hired and all 
requisitions for which a non-minority (White) candidate was hired. 
 Model 1 of Table 5 shows the odds of voluntary turnover when a female candidate is 
hired.  The odds ratio for the interaction between female rejected candidate and gender profile 
(percentage of female workers in the job applied to) is non-significant (p = .63); for every unit 
(1%) increase in the percent of female workers employed in the requisition job, the odds of 
turnover do not differ for men and women when a female candidate is hired.  However, when the 
a male candidate is hired (as shown in Model 2), the odds ratio for the interaction between 
female rejected candidate and gender profile is significant (p < .05); for every unit (1%) increase 
in the percent of female workers employed in the requisition job, the odds of turnover for 
rejected female candidates increase by a factor of 1.03 when a male candidate is hired.  If a 
female candidate is hired into a job that is dominated by female workers, rejected male and 
female candidates are not more or less likely to leave.  However, when a male candidate is hired 
into a female-dominated job, rejected female candidates are more likely to leave. 
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 The odds ratios for the interactions between minority internal candidate and incumbent 
minority profile (percentage of minority incumbents in the job applied to) are presented in Model 
3 and Model 4 of Table 5.  Model 3 shows the odds of voluntary turnover when a minority 
candidate is hired.  The odds ratio for the interaction in Model 3 is significant (p < .05); for every 
unit (1%) increase in the percentage of minority workers employed in the requisition job, the 
odds of turnover for rejected minority candidates decrease by a factor of 0.97 when a minority 
candidate is hired.  However, when non-minority (White) candidate is hired as shown in Model 
4, the odds ratio for the interaction is not significant (p = .82); for every unit (1%) increase in the 
percentage of minority workers employed in the requisition job, the odds of turnover do not 
differ for rejected minority and non-minority (White) candidates when a non-minority (White) 
candidate is hired.  In other words, if a non-minority (White) candidate is hired for a job that is 
dominated by minority workers, rejected minority and non-minority (White) candidates are not 
more or less likely to leave.  When a minority candidate is hired, however, rejected minority 
candidates are less likely to leave.  More detailed interpretations of the effects for these 
interactions are addressed further in the discussion.
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Table 5. Odds of voluntary turnover in the year following a rejection – Supplementary results for Hypothesis 3c  












     
Female loser 0.915 0.110* 0.916 0.894 
 (0.913) (0.105) (0.298) (0.214) 
Minority loser 1.255 1.523 3.528* 1.188 
 (0.287) (0.517) (1.945) (0.600) 
Tenure (ln) 0.549** 0.795 0.649 0.538** 
 (0.105) (0.233) (0.179) (0.102) 
Salary (ln) 0.706 0.953 1.454 0.681 
 (0.373) (0.651) (0.936) (0.351) 
Recent performance rating 0.777 0.507* 0.594* 0.759 
 (0.141) (0.146) (0.149) (0.147) 
County unemployment rate 1.103 0.511*** 1.088 0.814+ 
 (0.131) (0.0915) (0.192) (0.0962) 
Average exit rate by job 1.049* 1.056 1.006 1.074** 
 (0.0203) (0.0355) (0.0251) (0.0250) 
Same ethnicity 0.980 1.079   
 (0.213) (0.369)   
Same gender   1.783+ 1.172 
   (0.549) (0.270) 
% Female 0.990 0.979*   
 (0.0113) (0.00950)   
% Female x Female loser 1.007 1.031*   
 (0.0138) (0.0145)   
% Minority   1.017 0.985 
   (0.0106) (0.00974) 
% Minority x Minority loser   0.971* 1.003 
   (0.0137) (0.0153) 
     
Constant 28.82 1,637 0.00407 686.0 
 (184.2) (13,592) (0.0273) (4,112) 
     
Observations 1,590 623 634 1,583 
Note: Controls for losers’ current job level included but not shown 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10
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Job-related similarity.  Previous research shows that, in addition to gender and race, 
rejected candidates compare themselves to those selected on a number of work-related factors 
such as perceived similarities in work experiences and job attitudes (i.e., Schaubroeck & Lam 
2004).  Following this work, we created several variables from HealthCo’s personnel records to 
test effects for job-related similarity of rejected and selected candidates.  These variables include 
their difference in tenure with HealthCo, whether they came from the same job level, same job 
function, or same department at the time of application, and whether rejected candidates’ last 
performance ratings were lower or higher than the selected candidates’.  Because job-related 
similarity with the selected candidates only applies to requisitions where another internal 
candidate was hired, we ran these models using a subsample of rejected internal candidates 
(1,684 candidates).  According to our theory, if a candidate with similar job-related attributes is 
hired, rejected candidates should perceive a higher chance of future internal mobility following 
rejection and should therefore be less likely to voluntarily exit the organization.  Winners’ 
similar attributes provide information that future mobility and advancement is likely.  Shown in 
Table 6, although we only find a significant effect of same function (p < .05), we do find results 
in the expected direction for most of these variables.  When there is less of a difference in tenure 
between the two candidates and when the winning candidate comes from the same job function 
or department, rejected candidates are less likely to voluntarily exit.  They are also less likely to 
exit when those selected have lower performance ratings but more likely to leave when hires 
have higher ratings, suggesting they may gauge mobility potential based on where they stand in 
the performance distribution. 
The lack of significant results, however, may be attributed to unsuccessful candidates not 
having enough detailed information on selected candidates to make comparisons that ultimately	
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affect their decision to leave the organization.  While previous studies generally assumed that 
workers within the same job competed for a nearby promotion (i.e., Lam & Schaubroeck, 2000; 
Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004), employees apply to jobs across the organization in contemporary 
ILMs.  While rejected internal candidates are likely to know who was hired for positions, their 
knowledge of the winning candidates’ backgrounds and work experience may be limited.  
Additionally, although we argue that rejected candidates interpret similar winner attributes as 
positive information for their future mobility, we cannot rule out the possibility that they may be 
engaging in social comparison in some cases and therefore may be more likely to leave (as was 
true when successful candidates came from the same job level, shown in Model 1; i.e., Garcia, 
Tor, & Schiff, 2013).  Our results differ from past work on comparisons, which shows that 
greater perceived similarity with the selected candidates results in negative outcomes (e.g. 
Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004).  However, it is possible that these differences are due to self-report 
perceptions of similarity and outcomes such as perceived envy rather than objective measures of 
job-related similarity and how rejected internal candidates use this information to think 
strategically about their careers.
		36 
Table 6. Odds of voluntary turnover in the year following a rejection – Supplementary results for loser and winner job-related similarity 
       
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Female loser 0.802 0.812 0.783 0.807 0.810 0.815 
 (0.181) (0.184) (0.176) (0.181) (0.183) (0.185) 
Minority loser 1.251 1.252 1.254 1.239 1.250 1.251 
 (0.295) (0.295) (0.298) (0.293) (0.295) (0.296) 
Tenure (ln) 0.569** 0.602** 0.562** 0.577** 0.596** 0.591** 
 (0.106) (0.117) (0.109) (0.114) (0.116) (0.114) 
Salary (ln) 1.055 1.084 1.115 1.070 1.053 1.062 
 (0.470) (0.485) (0.503) (0.471) (0.464) (0.471) 
Recent performance rating 0.634* 0.630* 0.642* 0.637* 0.641* 0.647* 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.123) (0.119) 
County unemployment rate 0.937 0.940 0.943 0.942 0.941 0.941 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) 
Average exit rate by job 1.049* 1.052* 1.050* 1.050* 1.051* 1.050* 
 (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
Same gender 1.173 1.182 1.179 1.192 1.183 1.186 
 (0.257) (0.259) (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259) 
Same ethnicity 0.843 0.853 0.845 0.843 0.848 0.848 
 (0.189) (0.191) (0.191) (0.189) (0.190) (0.190) 
Difference in tenure (ln) 1.130      
 (0.143)      
Same job level  1.196     
  (0.230)     
Same function   0.675*    
   (0.126)    
Same department    0.767   
    (0.178)   
Lower performance rating than winner     1.038  
     (0.224)  
Higher performance rating than winner      0.853 
      (0.237) 
Constant 0.966 0.657 0.705 0.945 0.976 0.933 
 (5.103) (3.503) (3.737) (4.939) (5.108) (4.897) 
       
Observations 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 
Note: Controls for losers’ current job level included but not shown 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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DISCUSSION 
 Understanding how employees think about their careers and assess their prospects for 
future mobility is especially important for contemporary ILMs, where there is uncertainty 
surrounding mobility and rejection is frequent.  Although the majority of prior research on 
rejection has suggested that internal candidates respond similarly to rejection (e.g., with 
decreased organizational attitudes, increased envy, and perceptions of unfairness), we suggest 
that internal candidates respond differentially to rejection, in part because employees rely on 
rejection as a key source of information regarding their potential for future internal mobility.  We 
have argued that rejected internal candidates are more likely to leave when they perceive less 
chance of future mobility within their firms, and they assess their likelihood of future mobility by 
considering who was hired, how far they progressed in the hiring process before rejection, and 
how likely they were to be selected for the job in the first place. 
The analyses provide strong support for our first two hypotheses.  First, rejected internal 
candidates are much more likely to stay with their organization when another internal candidate 
is hired as opposed to when an external candidate is hired.  Second, internal candidates who 
make it to the furthest stage in the hiring process before rejection – and are therefore interviewed 
by the hiring manager – are much more likely to stay than if they were rejected earlier in the 
hiring process.  The findings suggest that these aspects of the hiring process provide particularly 
salient information to rejected candidates regarding their potential for future internal mobility 
opportunities, consistent with our arguments rooted in the literatures on vacancy chains and 
social exchange.  Although firms continue to increase external hiring at all organizational levels 
(Royal & Althauser, 2003), internal candidates and other internal employees alike may perceive 
their chances of future advancement blocked when jobs are filled externally and may choose to 
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leave.  Supplementary analyses showed that this is especially true for high-performing internal 
candidates that the organization does not want to lose, underlining the potential trade-off 
between increased flexibility and developing high-quality internal talent.  Additionally, the 
effects for rejection stage support the argument that, although external candidates may react 
negatively to being rejected later in the process (i.e., Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015), internal 
candidates who are interviewed by a hiring manager are likely to believe they were seriously and 
fairly considered as strong candidates.  They are thus likely to perceive additional future 
opportunities within the organization. 
 We find support for most, but not all, of our hypotheses related to expectations.  The 
effects of potential expectancy violations on turnover appear to be stronger if internal candidates 
form expectations based on attributes of the job rather than on the incumbents in that job.  
Internal candidates are more likely to leave when rejected for jobs that are a better 
skill/competency match (jobs that are similar and jobs that are transfers).  This suggests that they 
might perceive lower likelihood of future advancement if they are unable to be selected for jobs 
for which they already possess the required competencies and therefore presumably “fit.”  We 
also argued that internal candidates might have higher expectations of getting jobs for which 
there is less internal competition, or jobs for which there is higher probability of being selected.  
We find marginal support for this hypothesis as well, indicating that rejected candidates may 
perceive lower likelihood of future mobility when rejected for jobs that have less competition, or 
jobs for which there was a high chance of being selected.  In both cases (skill/competency fit and 
competition), the findings suggest that rejected internal candidates are probably less likely to 
expect to advance to jobs that are much more different from their current jobs and much more 
competitive if they are not selected for jobs that are similar and less competitive. 
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 The results for incumbent gender (percentage of female workers in the job) and minority 
(percentage of minority workers in the job) profile are more mixed.  We do not find support for 
our hypothesis that internal candidates who “match” the gender and minority composition are 
more likely to leave when rejected for these positions.  However, supplementary analyses 
revealed that the gender and minority status of the winner does affect likelihood of voluntary exit.  
Female candidates are more likely to leave when rejected for a job that is dominated by female 
workers specifically when a male candidate is hired, while minority candidates are less likely to 
leave when rejected for a job that is dominated by minority workers if another minority 
candidate is hired.  Therefore, although we argued that internal candidates experience expectancy 
violations following rejection for certain jobs, this appears to be true more so for the incumbent 
gender profile than the incumbent minority profile.  In other words, rejected female candidates 
experience expectancy violations and perceive less chance of future mobility if a male candidate 
is hired for the job, whereas rejected minority candidates perceive other minority members’ 
mobility as positive for their future mobility.  They may be less affected by potential expectancy 
violations resulting from non-minority (White) candidates being hired. 
 It is worth noting that rejected internal candidates may be less likely to experience strong 
expectancy violations based on demographic fit in organizations that have recently increased 
diversity-related initiatives or where diversity concerns and values are communicated to 
employees.  In cases where employees are told that the organization is looking to diversify jobs 
that are largely female, for example, the impact of rejection may be reduced for female 
candidates if a male candidate is hired.  However, it is unlikely that internal candidates would not 
at least form initial expectations of being hired based on their demographic fit.  Although 
previous work shows that targeted recruiting influences perceptions of fit for targeted groups 
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under certain conditions (see Avery & McKay, 2006), targeted and non-targeted applicants’ 
previous workplace experiences shape their interpretation of these recruiting methods and 
influence perceptions of fit as well (Williamson et al., 2008).  Despite efforts to communicate to 
employees the need for increased diversity in a given job, internal candidates in particular may 
continue to form expectations of fit based on their cognitive maps constructed by the 
organizations’ prior hiring decisions.  That said, when organizations actively engage in diversity-
related hiring and promotion methods and continually fill jobs with a diverse set of hires, this 
also likely sends an additional source of information to internal candidates about their potential 
for future internal mobility, depending on their demographic attributes. 
Finally, although we also ran supplementary analyses testing effects for additional 
winning-candidate attributes, we did not find consistent results for these models.  It is possible 
that rejected candidates do not have enough job-related information on winners to make strategic 
comparisons.  Where they do, they may also engage in social comparison if they come from the 
same job function.  The effects on voluntary exit may therefore be weaker if rejected candidates 
experience negative affect from social comparison while simultaneously considering how 
similarity with the winner could be positive for their future careers in the organization.  
This research has three main theoretical contributions.  First, this study contributes 
broadly to the research on careers and career development in contemporary ILMs.  We suggest 
that, in ILMs that lack traditional structures guiding employee advancement, internal candidates 
use different sources of information to determine whether or not they have future careers within 
the organization.  This has interesting implications for the types of theories used to argue what 
internal employees “presume” from their organizations.  For example, the traditional use of a 
number of theories such as social exchange might suggest that internal employees feel that their 
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organizations are obligated to reciprocate hard work and commitment with internal mobility 
opportunities.  We suggest, however, that the underlying assumptions of the literatures on 
vacancy chains, social exchange, and expectancy violations can be used to explain how internal 
employees (and rejected internal candidates in particular) use information from the 
organization’s hiring process and decisions to assess whether they have future mobility 
opportunities in the organization.  In other words, these theories help us argue when and why 
rejected candidates will stay or go based on information regarding their future careers rather than 
an implicit assumption of what, if anything, the organization owes them.  This is consistent with 
the perspective that employees are now responsible for taking ownership of building their careers 
(e.g., Cappelli, 2008), rather than ceding control to their employer. 
 Second, and more specifically, we contribute to the literature on rejection in 
organizations.  Much previous work naturally focuses on outcomes for winning rather than 
losing candidates given the value to organizations and general access to data on selected 
candidates.  For example, research has identified a number of structural and individual factors 
that shape who is likely to be hired for certain positions, including personal relationships (e.g., 
Podolny & Baron, 1997), visibility (e.g., Kalev, 2009), and work experience and developmental 
assignments (e.g., DeRue & Wellman, 2009; Dragoni et al., 2009), as well as outcomes for 
winners such as performance and eventual turnover (e.g., Bidwell, 2011).  The limited research 
on rejected candidates, however, generally falls into two categories: (1) outcomes for those who 
are rejected versus those who are selected and (2) comparisons among rejected candidates.  The 
former category includes studies that examine altered perceptions of procedural and distributive 
fairness (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003) and violations of psychological contracts (Robinson, 
1996), as well as changes in organizational attitudes and behaviors following a promotion 
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decision (Lam & Schaubroeck, 2000; Schwarzwald et al., 1992).  The latter includes research on 
content and framing of rejection letters (e.g., Gilliland et al., 2001), which rejected candidates are 
more likely to act out against their organizations (e.g., Fine et al., 2016), and how employees 
sensemake about denied promotions (e.g., Vough & Caza, 2017).  While both categories inform 
rejection research broadly, the latter allows us to explore nuances among rejected candidates and 
further our understanding of the ways in which rejection shapes organizational phenomena.  We 
complement work in this latter category by arguing that rejected internal candidates interpret 
information from the hiring process to assess their future internal mobility opportunities.  
Importantly, our conceptualization of rejection as information is distinct from previous research 
which suggests that, in general, candidates respond negatively to rejection. 
 Third, we add to the literatures emphasizing the role of information in market 
transactions (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Powell et al., 2005; Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo, 
2010; Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015).  While many previous studies on hiring do so in the 
context of market transactions external to the organization, we propose that job posting systems 
in contemporary ILMs create internal markets with informational characteristics similar to 
external markets.  Interactions between employees and their organizations – including 
interactions resulting in rejection – have implications for their future transactions and outcomes 
such as voluntary exit. 
As with any single firm study, it is difficult to assess the generalizability of our findings.  
While it would be ideal to have data from multiple firms, we have detailed applicant and 
personnel data on internal candidates and candidates’ attempted moves (as well as data on both 
the winning candidates and the specific job postings) that would be challenging to obtain from 
more than one organization.  However, employees in much smaller organizations may think 
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about internal mobility differently depending on, for example, the transparency of the job posting 
system or internal mobility practices specific to certain organizations.  They may therefore 
interpret information from rejection differently than we have discussed here.  Second, it is likely 
that internal candidates use many sources of information when evaluating their potential fit with 
specific jobs and forming expectations of being selected for those jobs.  In addition to demands-
abilities fit and demographic fit, candidates may form expectations based on posted job 
descriptions, attributes of more recent hires rather than the majority of incumbents in the year 
preceding application, and information directly provided to them by hiring managers or other 
senior co-workers.  Third, and relatedly, although we have detailed data from personnel and 
application records, we do not have survey data that measures rejected candidates’ perceptions of 
future internal mobility or emotional reactions to being rejected.  A more comprehensive study 
of rejection in contemporary ILMs would combine both survey and archival data to more fully 
understand how internal candidates respond to being rejected and how rejection affects their 
perceptions of future internal advancement opportunities. 
Future research might also consider how internal candidates who apply for multiple jobs 
over the course of a year respond following multiple rejections and how this shapes their careers 
within organizations.  Without additional data sources, it is difficult to determine which 
rejections have the greatest impact on rejected candidates, how the cumulative effects of multiple 
rejections within a given time period might alter their experience throughout each subsequent 
application process, and how the different information provided from each rejection influences 
perceptions of future internal mobility (i.e., where an internal candidate was hired following one 
rejection but an external candidate following a second).  This becomes increasingly more 
challenging when candidates apply for a number of jobs at once through their organizations’ 
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posting systems.  Future work would ideally track all applications and rejections over an 
extended period of time and include survey and/or qualitative data to more fully understand 
rejected candidates’ overall experience with rejection. 
Another promising avenue for future work would be to explore the overall effect of 
rejection by comparing rejected candidates to non-applicants.  Although candidates do have to 
apply for certain jobs if they want to be selected, it is possible that the effect of rejection may 
produce more negative outcomes than if individuals had not applied at all.  For example, in one 
of few studies to consider non-applicants in rejection research, Schwarzwald and colleagues 
(1992) showed that workers who submitted their candidacy for promotion and were rejected 
experienced lower commitment and absenteeism compared to non-applicants.  Similarly, 
research in this area could test whether rejected candidates who see other internal candidates 
being hired or make it further in the hiring process before rejection experience outcomes similar 
to non-applicants (e.g., lower turnover and potentially fewer changes in job attitudes), while 
those who see external candidates hired and experience earlier rejection are even more likely to 
leave when compared to non-applicants.  More research on rejected internal candidates versus 
non-applicants would establish a third category of rejection studies alongside those of rejected 
versus selected candidates and rejected versus rejected candidates. 
Finally, future research might also examine methods for reducing the negative effects of 
being rejected.  Previous research has shown that rejected external candidates respond more 
positively to rejection letters that provide explanations detailing, for example, qualifications of 
the winner and external conditions that impacted selection such as a hiring freeze (e.g., Gilliland 
et al., 2001).  However, candidates interpreting rejection as information would perhaps also 
benefit from personal explanations such as where they ranked relative to other internal and 
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external applicants (i.e., Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennett, 1999) as well as feedback on developing 
skills or taking on specific assignments to increase chances of selection after reapplication.  
Interventions designed to encourage internal candidates about their future advancement 
opportunities within their organizations following one or multiple rejections would also be an 
interesting opportunity for future work in this area. 
 This study offers a number of practical implications for hiring managers and 
organizations alike.  Ultimately, the findings highlight the importance of paying close attention 
to internal candidates who are rejected – and how they are rejected – if organizations want them 
to stay.  For example, organizations might think carefully about which positions they fill with 
internal versus external candidates from both the firm’s and workers’ perspectives.  While it may 
be beneficial for organizations to hire externally for specific jobs, high-performing internal 
candidates may question whether future opportunities will continue to be filled with internal 
workers.  Additionally, it is advantageous for organizations to ensure that high-performing 
internal candidates are at least interviewed by a hiring manager before they are rejected.  Firms 
have less control over the similarity between employees’ current jobs and the jobs they choose 
applied to (both in terms of competencies and organizational rank) and the amount of 
competition generated for certain job postings.  However, organizations might consider how 
consistently filling jobs with specific gender or racial minority groups impacts internal 
candidates’ expectations of being selected in the future.  Without clear paths for internal 
advancement and proper communication following rejection, rejected internal candidates 
interpret these aspects of the hiring process as information for their future careers within their 
organizations.  Often overlooked, the differential effects of rejection may impose sizeable costs 
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